The UN General Assembly adopted the ninth review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) today, July 1, 2026. The text presented to the UN General Assembly membership represented a complete technical rollover – minus two paragraphs on COVID. For the first time in twenty years, the resolution was not adopted by consensus after the United States delegation called a vote on the text. In the end, the text was adopted with the support of 140 states, with 3 states voting against and 1 state abstaining.

Today’s adoption marks an unwanted milestone: it has now been five years – and two consecutive negotiating cycles – with almost no substantive updates to the GCTS. This development should cause serious reflection for UN leadership as to whether the GCTS is fit for purpose in the fast changing world that we are living in. 

We commend efforts by many delegations throughout the process to preserve and strengthen language protecting gender equality, human rights, civic space, and civil society participation. The preservation of these elements of the GCTS sends a strong signal that these safeguards are not peripheral to effective counter-terrorism work - they are central to it. A counter-terrorism strategy that erodes human rights and due process, undermines the rule of law, or suppresses civil society is a strategy that fails on its own terms. We are encouraged by the efforts of delegations that fought to maintain these commitments and call on all Member States to resist the ahistorical and increasingly politicized attacks on these core issues.

We deeply regret that this review did not produce stronger language on accountability, transparency and oversight of the UN counter-terrorism architecture despite evidence of the need for it, several opportunities and attempts to do so during the negotiations, and interest across a broad group of Member States. This failure is deeply concerning. There is widespread evidence of the potential negative impacts of counter-terrorism measures on human rights and civic space. To ensure that these negative impacts are not carried out in the UN’s name, robust oversight must be pursued to prevent potential reputational risks. This is especially important given the continued growth of the counter-terrorism architecture over the last decade.

Independent oversight of the UN counter-terrorism architecture remains firmly in the interest of the UN itself and of Member States. The failure by Member States to update the strategy in this regard undermines the credibility of the institution implementing it. As the UN counter-terrorism system moves forward, Member States must commit to a serious institutional reckoning: rightsizing the architecture to fit its actual mandate, ensuring that every UN counter-terrorism activity can withstand independent scrutiny, and building a transparent results-based culture that focuses on delivering outcomes, not simply outputs.

While the technical rollover did not include any new terminology or further conflation of terrorism with other issues, there were multiple attempts by delegations to introduce new concepts that have no place in a global counter-terrorism strategy. The CSO Coalition has consistently cautioned against allowing any terminology that is ill-defined, overbroad or could be used to limit freedoms and curtail human rights. While we recognize the need for consensus-building in an increasingly polarized multilateral negotiating environment, certain terminology and conceptual issues required far stronger pushback than they received during negotiations. Efforts to add language on ‘extremism’ without any qualifications (such as the compromise language, ‘violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism’, as agreed during the 7th review) is a dangerous move that must be opposed in all forums. Similarly, pushes to further include ‘hate speech’ under counter-terrorism frameworks should be opposed, as this issue is better addressed through the UN human rights system. Further, the CSO Coalition has also noted serious concern throughout the process with the conflation of terrorism with other issues in the context of the GCTS resolution, such as 'transnational organized crime', as well as any other broad and undefined language. The UN counter-terrorism architecture is not the appropriate structure to address these issues, and the conflation of many different challenges with terrorism undermines ongoing efforts to address these issues while also presenting the risks of human rights harms. 

The negotiating environment surrounding this review was fraught with obstacles that undermined the potential for meaningful progress. The delayed appointment of co-facilitators compromised the process from the outset. Unfortunately, this also contributed to a concerning regression in civil society engagement from past practice. Although far from perfect processes, the seventh and eighth reviews began to demonstrate the value of meaningful civil society participation at all stages in the negotiations. The ninth review showed a decline in both the depth and breadth of this engagement. We commend the co-facilitators' efforts to maintain the practice of hosting a Civil Society Townhall, but note that their approach fell short of the process established in the eighth review and of other best practices with the UN system. We urge Member States to champion multiple engagement tracks to ensure civil society is meaningfully represented not only throughout all stages of the negotiation process, but also in the implementation of the GCTS that shape the UN's counter-terrorism architecture.

Ultimately, the CSO Coalition maintains that a deeper review of the UN counter-terrorism architecture will be a crucial job for the tenth UN Secretary-General and her team. In the meantime, implementation of the GCTS must remain in compliance with international human rights law and ensure that no human rights harms are perpetrated in the name of UN counter terrorism. In previous review cycles, the UN counter-terrorism system has demonstrated a pattern of delayed implementation with concrete action compressed into the final months before the next review cycle. This compressed timeline undermines accountability and prevents the kind of systematic, evidence-based implementation that Member States have committed to in principle. Member States should actively benchmark the Office of Counter-Terrorism and other implementing entities against the commitments they have endorsed. Progress should not be concentrated at the end of the cycle - it must unfold continuously and transparently. 

The CSO Coalition urges Member States to continue to promote a UN counter-terrorism approach that is accountable and rights-based, in collaboration with civil society and other stakeholders. 

END.